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Abstract
The rise of public sector unions is one of the most significant but least examined 
movements for legal rights and social change. Through the 1950s, government employees 
typically had no right to bargain collectively or even to organize unions–rights often regarded as  
fundamental human rights–and public sector unions were small and relatively powerless.  Yet 
today, unions represent more than 40 percent of all public workers, government employees make 
up about 40 percent of the entire U.S. labor movement, and public sector unions are among the 
strongest political advocacy groups in the country.  This became possible only through a 
revolution of reform in state legislation in the past forty years:   state laws that grant public 
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively.  This sea-change in law and politics and 
the accompanying vast expansion of a social movement is notable in that it was done neither 
through federal laws nor a Supreme Court decision, but rather through state statutes and political 
action.  In this era of federalism, such mechanisms of legal reform deserve increased scrutiny.
Using archival documents of the groups involved, this article analyzes the first political 
victory on this issue:  Wisconsin’s public sector laws of 1959 and 1962.  These laws created the 
first state statute to grant organizing and collective bargaining rights to public employees.  The 
passage of this law required a decade-long battle over ideas, political power, and legal doctrines.  
The article traces this struggle in all of these arenas, describing how the interaction of theory, 
evolving societal norms, and political muscle started a wave of reform in a crucial area:  the legal 
regulation of a social and economic movement.  The result was a fundamental turning point in 
the legal rights of workers in this country and in American politics.  It is also a case study of how 
significant social and political change can be accomplished at the level of state statutes.  
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Of all the movements for legal rights and political power in the second half of the 
twentieth century, one of the most significant but least examined has been the rise of public 
sector labor unions.  Well into the 1950s, government employees in the United States typically 
had no right to bargain collectively or even to organize into unions–rights often regarded as  
fundamental human rights2–and public sector unions were small and relatively powerless.  Yet 
2As James Gross has explained, Article 23 (4) of the United Nation’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights issued in1948 includes the right to form and join unions.  Article 
22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States ratified in 
1992, incorporates the language of the Universal Declaration:  “Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.” And Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
3today, more than 40 percent of all public workers are represented by unions; government 
employees make up about 40 percent of the entire American labor movement; and public sector 
unions are among the strongest political advocacy groups, on both national and local political 
levels, in the country.3
This became possible only through a revolution of reform in state legislation in the past 
forty years: state laws that grant government employees the right to organize and bargain 
collectively.  Public sector labor laws developed much later and more unevenly than did private 
sector law.  While many private sector workers won the right to organize, bargain, and strike in 
the 1930s with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),4 such rights did not even begin to be 
granted in the public sector until the 1960s (even today, about twenty states deny bargaining 
rights to most or all public workers).5  Yet when public sector unions began winning the rights to 
organize and bargain, it resulted in decades of successful union organization that has no parallel 
in any form of employment in U.S.  history. 
Cultural Rights also affirms the “right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union 
of his choice.”  James A. Gross, Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations 
Law: a Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP POLICY J. 65 
(1999), at 71-72.
3See, e.g., Gregory Saltzman, Bargaining Laws as a Cause and a Consequence of the 
Growth of Teacher Unionism, 38 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 335 (1985); Vijay 
Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why it Should Matter to the Public and to Academia 5 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401 (2003) (the “political clout” of public sector unions is “quite 
great,” and “one could argue that the political power that public sector unions now enjoy would 
never have existed but for their right to collectively bargain”), id. at 407 & n. 29.
429 U.S. C. § 151, et seq., 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
5See RICHARD KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (3d ed. 2001), 58-59.
4This sea-change in law and politics and the accompanying vast expansion of a social 
movement was aided by the law, but in a different way than the more familiar narratives of other 
previously disempowered groups.   While legal scholarship often focuses more on fights for 
rights that end in courtroom victories, from Brown v.  Bd.  of Education6 through Lawrence v.  
Texas,7 or federal legislation such as the NLRA or Title VII,8 public workers won their fight 
through statutes, not the courts, and in state legislatures, not at the federal level.  In this era of 
federalism, such mechanisms of legal reform deserve increased scrutiny.
This article analyzes the first political and legal victory on this issue:  Wisconsin’s public 
sector laws of 1959 and 1962.  These laws created the first state statute to grant organizing and 
collective bargaining rights to public employees.  The passage of this law required a decade-long 
battle over ideas, political power, and legal doctrine.  The result was a fundamental turning point 
in the legal rights of workers in this country and in American politics.  It is also a case study of 
how significant social and political change can be accomplished at the level of state statutes.  
The fight in Wisconsin was won primarily by local bodies of AFSCME, today the largest 
public sector union in America.  Union advocates encountered a range of objections that were 
steeped in history and indeed still resonate somewhat today:  real and alleged differences 
between public and private employment; a fear of strikes and “divided loyalty,” especially by 
police; constitutional doctrines involving state structure and sovereignty; and concerns over 
labor’s influence on government.  Unions employed a range of political tactics common not only 
6354 U.S. 1 (1952).
7539 U.S. 538 (2003).
5to labor law reform but to legal reforms of all kinds:  “bottom up” pressure on candidates and 
officeholders; a contest of ideas fought in the context of attitudes made more hospitable to 
reform by actual practices on the ground; gradual erosion of outdated legal rules; and a seminal 
victory that sparked change across the nation. 
This is the story of that seminal victory.  Part One traces the evolving context in which 
the battle was waged.  A prerequisite for legal reform is evolving attitudes toward a subject in the 
broader society.  The 1950s saw an increasing acceptance of public sector union rights in various 
popular, professional, and academic circles.  This change was necessary but not sufficient:  
courts still rejected any legal rights for public sector unions.  This Part also describes the growth 
of public sector unions, including AFSCME and Wisconsin’s political history.  Part Two studies 
the various failed attempts at passing a public sector labor statute, beginning in 1951, focusing 
on the types of objections reformers needed to overcome and what it took–in terms of political 
strategies, advocacy of ideas, and legislative compromises–to get the final laws passed.  Part 
Three discusses the passage of the 1959 bill, its successes and problems.  Part Four studies the 
1962 bill and continuing legal issues in this area, and draws some conclusions about the nature of 
legal reform.
I.  The Context for Reform.
A. Evolving Views of Public Sector Unions.
For labor as a whole, the 1950s in some ways featured unequaled successes.  Overall 
union density climbed to nearly 35 percent, an all-time high.  In some senses, private sector 
8Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.
6unions now were now viewed as a legitimate part of the economic order, and courts routinely 
enforced the rights of private workers to organize, bargain, and strike.9   Yet public sector 
workers still lacked the basic rights to bargain and even to organize that private sector workers 
had won two decades earlier.
This lag was largely due to a prevailing attitude that public sector unions were entirely 
different from private sector unions.  As one court put it, rejecting public employees’ claim for 
the right to organize, “Nothing can be gained by comparing public employment with private 
employment; there can be no analogy in such a comparison.”10  Notably, the prospect of public 
workers striking horrified judges, and those judges assumed that granting the right to organize 
and bargain would necessarily mean that government employees would strike.  This was true 
despite the facts that both AFL and CIO public sector unions had renounced the right to strike, 
and public sector strikes after the infamous Boston police strike of 1919 were small and rare.11
On the other hand, by the 1950s, outside courtrooms, public sector unions were winning 
increased acceptance.  The growth of government and civil service rules had created more 
professionalized public sector management, reflected in publications such as Public Personnel 
Review.12   Discussions of the role of unions had become more realistic.  An essay in the 1946 
9See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFKSY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA (1994); 
208-13; 60.
10Perez v.  Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles (Cal.App. 1947).  
For more on such pronouncements by courts, see SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS, Chapters 1-3.
11SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS, 166.  For details on the Boston strike itself, see id., Chap. 1.
12See, e.g., Rollin Posey, Employee Organizations in the United States Public Service, 
PUBLIC PERSONNEL REVIEW, Oct. 1956; W.G. Torpey, PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
7book Elements of Public Administration argued that while collective bargaining would have to 
take “different forms” in government employment, there was “considerable room for 
constructive participation of unions in grievance procedures and work relations generally.” 
Another essayist decried the old “authoritarian attitude” of government managers simply 
invoking governmental sovereignty as an excuse not to bargain.  A third author pointed out that 
the sheer number of union members made them “an important facet of personnel administration.”  
This article also critiqued the notion that unions could not be allowed in government for fear of 
loss of public services, noting that private sector workers in utilities, transportation, and food 
industries could strike.  In addition, it argued that the government had some authority to bargain, 
and it rejected the idea that unionized public workers would be biased in labor disputes.13
Academics increasingly stressed the similarities between private and public sector 
workers.  Morton Godine wrote in 1951 that public employees “are essentially wage earners” 
with the same economic interests and desire for a voice in their working conditions as private 
sector workers.  Rollin Posey agreed in 1956 that “the essence of unionism in the public service–
as in private employment–is the endeavor to improve wages, hours, and working conditions.”  
Harry Rains, a professor of industrial relations at Hofstra University, argued that public workers 
were “entitled to rights similar to those enjoyed by the rest of the working population.”  Godine 
quoted Franklin Roosevelt’s observation that the desire of public employees for reasonable pay, 
hours, and working conditions “is basically no different from that of employees in private 
(1953); W.E. MOSHER, J.D. KINGSLEY, AND O.G. STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
(1950); FRITZ MARX, ED., ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1946).
13Harvey Mansfield and Fritz Marx, Informal Organization, in MARX, ED., 313; Henry 
Reining, Jr., The Art of Supervision, id., 487-88; Milton Mandell, Personnel Standards, id., 574-
8industry.”  Irving Bernstein, then associate director of the University of California Institute of 
Industrial Relations, explained in 1959 that public sector unions were “going through the same 
struggle for the right to organize and bargain collectively as unions in private industry were 
going through in the early ’30s.”14
A huge obstacle to legal reform in this area had been fears dating from the disastrous 
Boston police strike of 1919.  While this issue had not gone away, the most dire predictions were 
somewhat muted by the reality that, in the following several decades, public sector unions rarely 
struck.  “The power of a strike lies at the root of all suspicion of public unions,” the Providence 
Evening Bulletin editorialized in 1957, but it added that in exchange for a bar on strikes, public 
sector unions should have binding mediation and arbitration to settle bargaining impasses.  A 
related fear, that public employees, especially police, would side with striking private sector 
workers, had also proven unfounded.  Godine explained that “the fear that unity with trade 
unions in private industry will lead to sympathetic strikes.  .  .  has not been supported by 
experience.”15  Still, these concerns were far from dead, as debates in Wisconsin would show.
Mainstream organizations showed similar evolving attitudes.  In the 1950s, the National 
Civil Service League endorsed the right of government employees to organize.  In 1959, the 
ACLU issued a statement arguing that public workers should have the right to organize, 
75.
14MORTON GODINE, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1951), 14, 11, 25, 36-
40, 133; Edward Cling, Industrial Labor Relations Policies and Practices in Municipal 
Government, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,” unpublished Ph.D. diss. (Northwestern University, 1957). 
738; Posey, 241; Harry Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment ,” LABOR LAW 
JOURNAL, (Aug.  1957): 548-550; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, July 1959, 3.
15PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, June 1957, 14; DAVID ZISKIND, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF 
9negotiate conditions of employment, and, except in essential services, strike.  In 1955, the 
American Bar Association’s Section on Labor Relations Law declared that public employees 
should have the right to organize, and that statutory bars on organizing, negotiating, and even 
striking were “not satisfactory approaches.”  Again, however, the precise solution was unclear.  
The ABA concluded that wherever “practicable,” rights in the private sector should be extended 
to the public sector, “modified to meet the unique needs of the public service.”16
Even some public employers were becoming more amenable.  A 1950 study of public 
administrators noted “an increased sense of responsibility on the part of unions.”  In a nod to the 
reality that public sector workers were organizing even in the absence of formal rights to do so, 
the International City Managers’ Association (ICMA), observed that the emergence of municipal 
unions would “have to be dealt with” and labeled AFSCME a “responsible” organization.  
Employers were more tolerant of organizing than of bargaining or arbitration.  Still, a 1958 
report by the ICMA listed “guidelines for constructive negotiation” with unions and even 
contained a call for state laws that would allow recognition and written bargaining agreements.  
This was in part, as AFSCME national president Arnold Zander suggested, simply a result of the 
persistence of organized public workers.  “Unions are here to stay on the municipal level,” the 
ICMA explained, “and it would be practical to recognize the fact.”17
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (1940) 195; Cling 161.
16Cling, 87, 283, 743; Wisconsin City & County Employee Union News (Union News), 
April, 1959, 2; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, May, 1959, 3; American Bar Association, Section of Labor 
Relations Law, Summary of the Committee on Labor Relations of the Governmental Employees, 
1955 PROCEEDINGS (1956), 90-91, 89.
17MOSHER, KINGSLEY, AND STAHL, 355; Cling, 195,174; Public Employee, Jan. 1961, 4-
5; ICMA, “Negotiations with Municipal Employee Organizations,” quoted in id., Dec. 1958, 18, 
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Thus began explorations of how labor law could be adjusted to fit the public sector. 
Reformers stressed that the tights to organize and to do some bargaining were reasonable, but 
their descriptions of how far to extend such rights and, especially, what to do if bargaining 
reached impasse–remained unclear.  Godine suggested that bargaining in some form was 
“inevitable,” and he rejected a legal argument that various courts had accepted:  that obliging 
sovereign governments to bargain with private parties such as unions would violate 
constitutional prohibitions on the non-delegation of state power.  Also, while Godine agreed that 
strikes by public workers should be barred, he argued that grievance machinery should be 
created to resolve labor-management issues.  Banning strikes alone was a “barren approach to a 
critical problem.”  His solution, however, was vague.  Godine called for “a measure of employee 
participation” less than full collective bargaining:  “some system of collective consultation which 
would recognize the right of public employees to share in the determination of their conditions of 
employment.”18   Creating specific legal rules would be central in Wisconsin and in the 
development of all modern public sector labor law.
B.  Growth of the Public Sector and Unions.
Legal change is not exclusively or primarily about ideas, however, and it is extremely 
unlikely that reform would have been successful without a strong national labor movement and 
its very determined public sector membership.  Overall, union membership had risen from about 
3.6 million in 1929 to about 18 million in 1954.  Moreover, by the later 1950s, government 
employees were a growing part of labor.  In 1956, there were 915,000 members of public sector 
19.
18GODINE, 28, 84, 87-89, 173, 2-3, 29, 9, 42; Cling, 152; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Sept. 7, 
1962, 5, 7.
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unions; by 1964 there were 1,453,000, increasing the proportion of public workers in the labor 
movement from 5.1 to 8.1 percent.19  Also, the leadership of the now-merged AFL-CIO had 
become more supportive.  The 1948 AFL national convention urged state federations to press for 
state laws granting public workers “the same legal rights and privileges.  .  .   now enjoyed by 
other workers in organized labor.”  AFSCME’s national journal, the Public Employee, claimed 
that the “national AFL-CIO is taking an active interest” in public sector rights; “never before has 
the word gone down from the top to every state.”  In 1959, the AFL-CIO convention resolved to 
make intensified efforts to pass laws guaranteeing organizing and bargaining rights.20
Also, the overall expansion of public employment contributed to the cause.  From 1947 to 
1956, the number of government workers nationally grew from 5.4 million to almost 7.3 million.  
By 1962, the 8.8 million public employees were approximately one-eighth of the nation’s labor 
force.  Notably, this growth took place almost entirely in state and local government: from 
3,560,000 workers in 1946 to 6,380,000 in 1962.  This increased scale caused legislatures to give 
administrators more authority to deal with public workers, which in turn made collective 
bargaining seem more realistic.21
19U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, PART I (1975), 176-77 (figures for 1929 are from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, data in possession of the author); Everett Kasalow, Recent Developments in Collective 
Bargaining for Public Employees, in JACK TRIPLETT, ED., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES (1966), 10.
20Union News, Nov.-Dec. 1948, 1, 4-5; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Feb. 1957, 20; id., July 1959, 
4; id., Nov. 1959, 4.
21KASALOW, 10; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, September 7, 1962, 5.
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The boom in state and local government employment greatly benefitted AFSCME, the 
“Union of the Future,” according to an article in Business Week.  “Industrial unions seem to be 
at the end of a line.  .  .  as more and more plants are automated,” the article explained, and 
employment for craft unions “is growing only slowly.  In public employment, however, there is 
an “expanding reservoir of workers.”  AFSCME would, the article accurately predicted, 
eventually rival the Teamsters in size and influence.  Similarly, the Christian Science Monitor
asked, “Is there another star for organized labor to hitch its wagon to?” There “lies outside 
industry an entire untapped pool of potential union membership–local and state government 
employees.”  AFSCME  “holds the inside track in this virgin territory.”22  And indeed, AFSCME 
would be the most important union backing legal change.
C.  Law and Practice in the 1950s.
The law lagged behind these trends considerably.  By the mid-1950s, the biggest court 
victory for public sector unions was still a lone, 1951 Connecticut Supreme Court decision, 
Norwalk Teachers’ Association v.  Bd.  of Education.23  This case held that, if a public employer 
had not prohibited it, organizing a union was legal and some very limited bargaining would not 
violate constitutional anti-delegation rules.  Norwalk did not allow any bargaining without the 
employer’s permission, rejected most forms of arbitration, did not allow strikes, and stated that 
an employer could always choose to bar even organizing.  And it was good law only in 
Connecticut.  In 1958, the Arkansas Supreme Court became the first court to strike down a ban 
22BUSINESS WEEK, March 21, 1959, quoted in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, May, 1959, 8; 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 16, 1961, quoted in id., Feb. 5, 1962, 5.
23138 Conn. 269 (1951).
13
on organizing in the public sector.  Ironically, Potts v.  Hay24 held that the ban violated the 
“right-to-work” clause in the state constitution, which provided that employment could not be 
based on union membership or the lack thereof.  Still, while these decisions gave a limited right 
to organize, they did not allow public sector unions to actually do much of anything.
Helping to pave the way for reform, however, was a reality on the ground that was 
increasingly different from the law on the books.  Despite the absence of legal authority 
permitting the practice, public sector negotiating, at least of informal agreements, was distinctly 
on the rise.  In 1946, a study found that ninety-seven cities had written agreements with 
employee organizations.  By 1957, AFSCME declared that it had “agreements” for 445 local 
unions or councils (although that was out of more than 1,500 locals).  The increasing disparity 
between the law and practice focused attention on how and whether such contracts could be 
enforced in light of delegation and related sovereignty concerns.  The National Civil Service 
League claimed that a city could join a union “not in a binding joint contract, but in a 
memorandum, freely accepted,” which the employer would administer.  The ABA argued that 
negotiated agreements could bind governments pursuant only to an unequivocal grant of power 
to the public employer in a statute.25  And whether arbitration should or could constitutionally be 
allowed was still controversial.
Opponents of public sector union rights were numerous and influential.  The anti-union 
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers and its general counsel Charles Rhyne argued 
24104 Ark. 438; 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958).
25Cling, 130, 123-24,126, 292; GODINE, 244; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Oct. 1957, 3; id., Feb. 
1957, 13.
14
through the 1950s that without specific legislative authorization government workers could not 
bargain at all, and that such authorization should not be granted.  Private sector business interests 
tended to agree.  And these opponents of reform had real political power.  In 1959, bills designed 
to limit explicitly the rights of public sector unions were introduced in Georgia, North Carolina, 
Texas, Tennessee, and Arkansas.  The North Carolina bill became law, barring all public 
employees from organizing and forbidding contracts or even “understandings”–written or oral–
between government employers and unions.26
Commentators noted the increasing discrepancy between law and reality.  Edward Cling 
argued that the “great deal of informal collective bargaining” in the public sector meant that “the 
legalistic approach,” that collective bargaining contracts inevitably were improper delegations of 
legislative power, “must be reviewed from a practical standpoint.”  Posey wrote that the risk of 
strikes in the public sector came from refusing to recognize unions, not from bargaining.  
Fundamentally, public workers had created a reality on the ground that made their call for 
bargaining rights seem both realistic and inevitable.27  This made it possible for AFSCME in 
Wisconsin to wage its lengthy and ultimately successful campaign.
D.  AFSCME Nationally.
AFSCME was chartered in 1936.  It had emerged from the Wisconsin State 
Administrative Employees Association, which was established in 1932.28   AFSCME’s growth 
26PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, July, 1959, 5, 19.
27Cling, 1-80, 85-86; 90-93, 134, 136, 741, 750.
28JOSEPH GOULDEN, JERRY WURF: LABOR’S LAST ANGRY MAN (1982), 27-31
15
was stunning.  In 1936, it had 5,355 members; in 1946, it claimed 78,164.29  This rose to more 
than 100,000 in 1954.  By 1959, with about 200,000 members, AFSCME was the twentieth 
largest of the AFL-CIO’s 125 unions; by 1961, with 210,000 members, AFSCME was 
eighteenth.  Contrary to the image of government employees  as white-collar bureaucrats, in 
1959 about 70 percent of AFSCME’s membership were blue-collar workers.30
AFSCME had called for formal bargaining and organizing rights as far back as its 1936 
convention, but by the mid-1950s, AFSCME was putting more emphasis on bargaining.  In 1957, 
Zander wrote that AFSCME had “begun to seek true collective bargaining, with contracts 
wherever and whenever possible.”  In 1959, Zander insisted that “collective bargaining has 
emerged.  .  .  as both the most effective operating tool this union possesses and the right we 
must struggle hardest to win.”31
This program required changes in the law.  In 1955, AFSCME asked the newly merged 
AFL-CIO to help pass state statutes granting organizing and bargaining rights, and in 1958, 
AFSCME announced a major push for such laws.  The union had experienced limited success at 
the local level.  In 1955, Philadelphia adopted a civil service regulation authorizing agreements 
with AFSCME Council 33 as the collective bargaining agent.  In 1958, AFSCME Council 37 
helped convince New York City Mayor Robert Wagner, Jr., to sign Executive Order 49, which 
29GODINE, 128; LARRY KRAMER, LABOR’S PARADOX: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO (1962), 1-23.
30PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, March 1958, 12; Union News, June 1958, 1; id., April 1959, 4; 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Nov. 1959, 5; id., May-June 1961, 3.
31KRAMER, 32, 33; Union News, Nov.-Dec. 1948, 1, 4-5; id., Sept.-Oct. 1955, 1; PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE, Jan. 1957, 3; id., July, 1959, 3; id., March 1959, 3.
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gave municipal workers organizing and bargaining rights.32  But AFSCME wanted state laws, 
insisting that recognition and bargaining rights were “the central need of the union.” AFSCME 
made international comparisons, noting that in seven of Canada’s ten provinces, there was “no 
distinction” between private sector and municipal workers; public employees had the right to 
organize, bargain, and even strike.  The “issue of legal sovereignty.  .  .  does not seem to have 
become a factor.”  Also, in England, the “problem” of public sector bargaining and organizing 
“simply does not exist.  .  .  .  There are no special laws” for public employees.  “They are 
governed by the same laws.  .  .  as everyone else.” Arbitration had been the norm since 1919; 
strikes were legal, but arbitration worked so well that strikes were “few and far between.”33
E.  AFSCME in Wisconsin.
Fittingly, AFSCME’s first success at passing a state law would be in the state in which 
AFSCME was born.  In 1938, there were around 6,000 members of AFSCME in Wisconsin; 
there were 12,000 by 1960, about 8 percent of Wisconsin’s public workforce.  Beyond their 
numbers, AFSCME became a potent political force.  AFSCME members were fairly equally 
divided between the local government workers in the Wisconsin Council of County and 
Municipal Employees (WCCME), which became AFSCME Council 40, and AFSCME’s State 
Employees Council.  The county and municipal employees in the WCCME were the force 
behind the public sector labor laws.  In 1951 the WCCME claimed seventy-nine locals, and by 
1958 it had ninety-seven, spread among nearly all of the major cities and most of the counties in 
Wisconsin.  In 1956, the WCCME had 4,500 members; and by 1960, 6,000.  Many WCCME 
32Cling, 460, 285-86; Union News, June, 1958, 1; GOULDEN, 54.
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members worked on highway construction projects, as Wisconsin undertook massive road 
improvement and construction programs in the 1950s.34
The WCCME was always active in politics and related forms of bargaining.  The 
WCCME’s paper, the Union News, quoted Samuel Gompers:  “There is not an action which the 
unions take, whether it be an increase of wages, [or] an hour more leisure.  .  .  without it being at 
the same time a political act.”  The WCCME engaged in informal bargaining well before any law 
authorized it; for example, it claimed that “negotiations” with the Kenosha County Board in 
1948 had yielded, among other things, a work week reduced to forty hours.  As early as 1949, 
WCCME locals met to discuss “bargaining techniques.  .  .  and the nature of requests to be made 
to county boards.”  Some agreements were written and signed by both parties.  Through the 
1950s, the WCCME touted significant successes from such processes; in 1950, Local 655, 
Jefferson County Highway Employees, had a signed agreement providing for a guaranteed work 
week, vacations, and arbitration.  In 1956, the Union News declared that “negotiations with 
management are carried on so smoothly that it is almost like regular business meetings.”  
Tellingly, however, the WCCME also referred to its practices as “petitioning.”  Certainly this 
“bargaining” had a different meaning than it had in the private sector.  For example, one local 
33PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Jan. 1957, 11, 17; id., April 1957, 5.
34Cling, 350-51; John Lawton to Walter Kohler (n.d., 1951), Walter Kohler Archives, 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Kohler Archives) box 77, folder 6; Industrial Commission 
of Wisconsin, “Wisconsin Employment Trends,” Feb.  28, 1955, id., box 68, folder 3; Union 
News, April 1958, 1; id., March-April 1956, 2; id., May, 1956, 1; Madison Union Labor News, 
Sept. 1960, 2; GORDON HAFERBECKER, WISCONSIN LABOR LAWS (1958), 4; WILLIAM 
THOMPSON, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, 1940-65 (VOL.  VI) (1988), 
107, 467-473, 616.
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appointed a seven-member “bargaining committee” which simply lobbied the Kenosha County 
Highway Board (successfully) for a pay increase.35
The WCCME’s influence grew and informal bargaining spread.  In the mid-1950s, of the 
state’s seventy-one county highway departments (which employed around 6,000 workers) forty-
seven had unions, thirty-one recognized their union as some form of bargaining agent, and 
eighteen had contracts or written agreements with unions.  In 1955, out of forty-nine towns with 
populations of more than 5,000 responding to a poll, thirty-four had at least some unionized 
employees.  Most of these (outside fire departments) were in AFSCME.  Fifteen towns did some 
bargaining, and twenty-eight of the remaining thirty-four reported “informal” union participation 
in wage determinations.  Ten towns had entered into a written agreement with their employees.  
On the other hand, highlighting historical objections to reform dating to the Boston police strike, 
four towns stated that they denied police the right to affiliate with the AFL or CIO.36
AFSCME was not satisfied, noting in1956 that wages and hours in the public sector were 
worse than in private employ.  WCCME Executive Director Robert Oberbeck claimed that the 
majority of AFSCME members made less than $1.40 an hour, while the average wage for 
production workers in the state was $2.02.  He also claimed that employees in sixty-seven of the 
seventy-one county highway departments worked forty-five to sixty hour weeks, while the 
35Union News, Sept.-Oct. 1952, 2; id., Nov.-Dec. 1948, 4; id., July-Aug. 1949, 1; id., Jan-
Feb. 1950, 4; id., June 1956, 4; id., Nov.-Dec. 1949, 4; id., May-June 1950, 4.
36Cling, 352-55.  The Boston police struck over whether they had to right to form a union 
affiliated with the labor movement (specifically, the AFL); opponents of the union argued that 
affiliated police could not be neutral when policing strikes by other affiliated unions.  In the 
wake of that strike, many localities banned any such affiliation.  SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS, 
Chap. 1.
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average in private industry was less than forty-two hours.  Moreover, sixty county highway 
departments paid no premium for overtime.  Also, Oberbeck argued that in Wisconsin, a number 
of local government employers discriminated against union supporters.37
Meanwhile, significant opposition to public sector labor rights remained.  In 1943, 
Milwaukee garbage workers not affiliated with the labor movement had struck for several days, 
alarming the public.  The Milwaukee Journal called for a law formally outlawing public sector 
strikes, and it remained skeptical of labor in government employment through the 1950s.  In 
1953, after AFSCME organized a union of Milwaukee County deputy sheriffs, the local civil 
service commission banned the union, citing fears of worker loyalties being divided between 
their union and their government employer.  AFSCME took this to court and lost.  In 1956, 
Milwaukee’s city attorney opined that collective bargaining would constitute an improper 
delegation of legislative power.38  AFSCME knew it needed new legal rules in the form of a new 
state law.
F. Wisconsin’s Employment Laws and Politics.
Through the New Deal, Wisconsin had been a pioneer in employment legislation. It was 
the first state to enact a workers’ compensation law in 1911, and it helped lead the way on 
unemployment compensation, industrial safety, and child labor.  This was due to progressive 
movements in the state:  most famously, the Republican party’s progressive wing, led by 
governors Robert LaFollette, Sr., and Philip LaFollette; the strong and politically active state 
37Union News, Aug. 1956, 1.
38Cling, 363-64, 573-575.
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AFL and CIO; and the close relationship of the University of Wisconsin to state government.  
The university was home to key industrial pluralists, such as John Commons and William 
Leiserson, who were central to New Deal labor policy.  The American Association for Labor 
Legislation was organized in Madison in 1907 and later had its headquarters in Commons’s 
office in the Wisconsin State Historical Library.39
The Wisconsin Labor Relations Act of 1937, modeled on the NLRA, was the first state 
labor statute.  It applied only to private employers, and it was administered by a three-member 
board (with members representing employers, labor, and the public) called the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board (WERB).  The Wisconsin Industrial Commission, which handled 
workers’ compensation and other employment laws, also had authority to mediate and arbitrate 
private sector labor disputes.  But no state agency or statute regulated unions in government 
employment, and the history of legislative action on that topic was scant:  In 1923, the Wisconsin 
Assembly had debated but did not pass a bill that would have made it illegal for any public 
worker to belong to a union.40
Also, after the New Deal, in Cling’s words, the state took a “conservative view” of labor 
legislation   While ranking around tenth in the nation in industrialization, Wisconsin also had a 
strong agricultural industry that pushed for restrictive labor laws.  The Progressive party fell 
apart after the pivotal elections of 1938, in which LaFollette lost the governor’s seat and many 
39HAFERBECKER, vi, 5-6, 9-11, 13, 183; Arvid Anderson, Wisconsin: A Pioneer in Labor 
Relations Law, in STATE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF ELIZABETH 
BRANDEIS RAUSHENBUSH (1966), 60; Cling, 378.
40HAFERBECKER, 15, 162-67, 170; Cling, 320-21; Bill 565-A, Wisconsin Assembly Bills, 
1923, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (WLRB).
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other progressives were swept out of office.  This election led to traditional Republican control 
of practically all arms of state government until 1958.  Republicans held the governorship from 
1939 to 1959, along with the offices of lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, and 
attorney general (except from 1948 to 1951, when Democrat Thomas Fairchild was attorney 
general).  And Republicans controlled both houses of the state assembly in this era.41
The rights of public sector unions would be a central battleground for a recovering 
Democratic party and the dominant Republicans in the 1950s.  After the demise of the 
Progressives, liberal groups reorganized as Democrats.  Labor was the most important of these 
constituencies, and labor and the Democrats increasingly looked to each other for support, which 
helped AFSCME.  In contrast, the Republican leadership from the late 1930s through the 1950s 
was dominated by industrialists such as Thomas Coleman, president of the Madison-Kipp 
Corporation, and Governor Walter Kohler.  The party was hardly friendly to labor or public 
workers.  William Thompson, a leading historian of Wisconsin, wrote that from 1947 to 1957, it 
was “painful for many Republicans” to realize that public employment was increasing and that 
public employees would not work at “servant’s wages.  .  .  .  Anathema to such Republicans was 
the possibility that these public employees would form unions.”42
The legal rights of public sector unions became a  recurring issue.   In 1938, Wisconsin 
attorney general Orlando Loomis found “no rule of law that would prohibit governmental 
employees from.  .  .  organizing,” and the city attorney of Milwaukee declared organizing 
lawful.  But then in 1940, Republican Attorney General John Martin wrote that in the absence of 
41Cling, 317, 323; THOMPSON, 401-02, 408-09.
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specific statutory authority, public employers could not enter into collective bargaining 
agreements.  In 1947, the Wisconsin Chamber of Commerce sponsored a bill that provided for 
discharge, fines, and imprisonment of government employees who struck.  It did not pass, but a 
bill restricting strikes against public utilities did.  This latter statute also provided collective 
bargaining rights for public utility workers, but the U.S. Supreme Court held that the NLRA pre-
empted that provision.  Also in 1947, the legislature rejected a bill that would have given 
government workers the right to organize and limited bargaining rights.  In 1949, AFSCME, 
while claiming credit for defeating the strike bill, added that it would be “in large measure a 
success” simply to keep “anti-public employee legislation from passing.”43
AFSCME tried to bend the law on the books to fit the reality of public sector organizing 
on the ground.  The union made some use of the WERB, the state agency overseeing private 
sector labor matters.  The WERB had no formal jurisdiction in the public sector, but it would still 
conduct representation elections in the public sector if both a government employer and a union 
requested it to do so, even though such elections were not legally binding.  Also, if both sides 
requested, WERB would assign mediators or fact finders to help governments and unions resolve 
differences.  So, for example, in the summer of 1950, WERB held a representation election for 
city workers in Mensasha, which AFSCME Local 1035 won, and in 1949 the Two Rivers City 
Employees Local requested WERB intervention in its wage dispute with the city.  But these 
42THOMPSON, 407, 413-15, 434-39, 456-59, 482, 614.
43Cling, 326-28, 334-35, 344, citing 27 Opinions of the Wisconsin Attorney General
(OAG) 245 (April 29, 1938) and 29 OAG 82 (Feb.  28, 1940); Union News, May-June 1950, 1; 
id., March-April 1949, 2; Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach 
Employees v.  WERB, 340 U.S.  383 (1951); HAFERBECKER, 174-75.
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limited procedures required atypically agreeable employers.  In 1956, Council 48 requested a 
formal collective bargaining contract with Milwaukee, noting that 2,700 of the city’s employees 
were union members.  AFSCME national president Zander came to Milwaukee to lobby for the 
cause.  But the city merely referred the matter to its attorney for advice, and there the matter 
died.44  AFSCME realized it needed a state law that would bind even anti-union employers.
II.  Learning Lessons and Focusing the Issues:  Battles over Bills from 1951-57.
A. The 1951 Bill and the Fear of Police Strikes.
The struggle for reform started in earnest in 1951 with a bill introduced by the WCCME, 
and it would continue for decades.  The initial attempt in 1951 foundered on rocks frustratingly 
familiar to public sector activists: the historically-based fear of police strikes.
Union attorney John Lawton, a shrewd strategist, was central to the campaign.  Lawton 
graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1942 and served as an assistant 
district attorney for Dane County, Wisconsin, from 1942 to 1946.  While in that job, he became 
president of AFSCME Local 720 (Dane County Employees).  Lawton was the WCCME’s 
executive secretary-treasurer from 1944 through the 1950s.  He also acted as its legislative 
representative in Madison and provided legal counsel to it and other public sector unions in 
Wisconsin from the late 1940s into the 1970s.  While in private practice, Lawton briefly was a 
partner of future governor Gaylord Nelson, the man who would ultimately sign Wisconsin’s first 
44Cling, 330-32, 570-76; Union News, July-Aug. 1950, 4; id., June-July, 1949, 4.
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public sector statute into law.  In the late 1940s, Lawton began calling for a state law granting 
public workers the rights to organize and bargain.45
In early 1951, Lawton drafted Bill 462-S for the WCCME.46  The bill covered municipal 
employees (employees of  cities, towns, villages, counties, school boards, or other subdivision of 
the state).  It provided a clear right to organize (giving employees the right to “form and join 
labor organizations of their own choice”), but, consistent with ambivalence of the time, was 
vague regarding bargaining.  The bill stated that its purpose was to promote “collective 
considerations” and to “encourage mutual understandings” concerning wages, hours, and 
working conditions.  “Collective considerations” were defined as “the study.  .  .  of terms or 
conditions of employment in a mutually genuine effort to reach an agreement.”  There was only 
limited recourse in case of a bargaining impasse.  If collective considerations failed to produce 
an agreement, then either party could petition the WERB for a conciliator.  The bill did not 
propose formal collective bargaining along private sector lines, probably because of the opinion 
of Vernon Thomson, the Republican attorney general and future governor, indicating that 
collective bargaining contracts in the public sector would violate anti-delegation rules.  The bill 
also made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with the rights that the bill 
provided.47
45Union News, July 1956, 1, 4; id., March-April 1950, 1, 4.
46Union News, May-June 1951, 1.
47Bill 462-S, Wisconsin Senate Bills, 1951, WLRB; Memo from B.  Lampert to [Vernon] 
Thomson, June 27, 1951, Kohler Archives, box 77, folder 6; 42 OAG 97 (1953); Union News, 
March-April 1951, 3; Cling 336-37.
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The legislative battle that followed featured the interest groups and arguments common in 
debates over public sector labor rights before and after.  The fight focused especially on the issue 
of police strikes, but it also foreshadowed new, practical issues involving the precise scope of 
union rights and the power of state labor agencies over local governments.  Organized public 
employers, the Wisconsin County Boards Association and the League of Wisconsin 
Municipalities, opposed the bill, as did private sector business interests such as the state 
Chamber of Commerce and the Wisconsin Manufacturers Association.  Opponents successfully 
sponsored an amendment that dropped the concept of “collective considerations” and added 
language stating that the bill did not confer a right to strike.  The WCCME unsuccessfully tried 
to amend the bill to clarify that the WERB had some enforcement powers:  the power to 
investigate complaints of violations of the law and issue findings of fact and recommendations.  
The state senate then passed the bill.  In the state assembly, AFSCME defeated an amendment 
that would have eliminated police and fire personnel from the bill’s coverage.48
Even though the bill stated that it did not grant a right to strike, opponents stressed that 
issue and related fears.  The Wisconsin State Journal raised the classic specter of the police 
strike, agreeing with A. J. Thelen, the executive secretary of the Wisconsin County Boards 
Association, that the bill should explicitly bar strikes and exclude law enforcement.  Lawton 
48Union News, March- April 1951, 2; Substitute Amendment to No. 1, S., to Bill No. 462, 
S, Wisconsin Senate Bills, 1951; Lawton to Kohler (n.d., 1951), Kohler Archives, box 77, folder 
6; JOURNAL OF THE SENATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 70TH SESSION OF THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE
(1951), 1183.
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replied truthfully that there had never been a strike of police or firefighters in Wisconsin and that 
the rules of the relevant unions barred such actions.  This fear, however, would prove fatal.49
The WCCME termed the right to organize “a basic right of citizenship,” but also tried 
making milder, politically palatable appeals.  The WCCME explained that the bill “does not 
require that the employer must give anything to his employees–it simply says they must talk to 
them about their problems.”  The WERB could conciliate but it could not force the parties to 
agree.  Appealing to modern sentiments that at least tolerated public sector unions, Lawton 
focused on specific instances of discrimination against workers for union activity.  Still, he felt 
compelled to answer older objections.  Lawton stressed that by “no stretch of the imagination” 
could the bill be interpreted to permit strikes, that AFSCME required the constitutions of its 
police locals to bar strikes, and that no AFSCME police local had ever struck.50
The final version of the bill retained the right to organize, but the proto-bargaining and 
enforcement provisions were weakened even further.  The concepts of “collective 
considerations” and “mutual understandings” were replaced with the even less specific idea of 
promoting “better relations” between the parties.  Conciliation by the WERB was limited to 
situations in which both parties (as opposed to either party), requested it.  The WERB could 
investigate alleged violations of the law and issue findings of fact and recommendations, but the 
recommendations were not binding and there were no sanctions for ignoring them.  AFSCME 
49Union News, March- April 1951, 3; “Arguments on 462-S,” (n.d., 1951), Kohler 
Archives, box 77, folder 6.
50Union News, March- April 1951, 2, 3; Lawton to Committee on Labor and Management 
(n.d., 1951); Lawton, “Memorandum re Bill No.  46-S” to Sen. Gordon Bubolz, May 4, 1951, 
Kohler Archives, box 77, folder 6.
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did succeed in keeping coverage of police and fire services, and while the bill stated that it did 
not confer a right to strike, it did not specify penalties for striking.  The bill thus amended passed 
and was sent to the desk of Governor Walter Kohler, Jr.51
Walter Kohler was the governor of Wisconsin from 1951 to 1957.  “Born to wealth and 
power,” in Thompson’s words, Kohler was the son of leading businessman Walter Kohler, Sr.  
(who served a term as governor during the 1920s).  He had past ties to his family’s concern, the 
Kohler Company, and he was not especially sympathetic to labor.   For example, he praised the 
Taft-Hartley Act and its “right to work” provisions as a “protection” for workers.  Further, in 
1951, Kohler had broken from tradition in his appointments to the WERB by replacing the labor 
representative with a second public representative.52
AFSCME lobbied Kohler to sign the bill, appealing to notions of rights now well 
established in the private sector.  Hundreds of workers signed petitions stating that “public 
employees should have the same right to organize and negotiate.  .  .  as our fellow workers in 
private industry.”  Local 1436, Jackson County Highway Employees, wrote Kohler that although 
“the county boards, the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the State Chamber of Commerce 
and the Wisconsin Association of Manufacturers are urging you to veto this bill, we believe this 
is directly against the rights and privileges of the American way of life.”  There should be “better 
51Bill No.  462-S as amended, Kohler Archives, box 77, folder 5; Lawton to Kohler (n.d., 
1951), id., folder 6; Memo from B.  Lampert to Thomson, June 27, 1951, id.; Amendment 1-S to 
Substitute Amendment 1-S to Bill No.  462-S, WISCONSIN SENATE BILLS, 1951; JOURNAL OF THE 
SENATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 70TH SESSION, 1365, 1399; Cling, 337.
52THOMPSON, 594, 620; Michael Essin, “Open Letter to Gov.  Kohler,” Nov.  22, 1952, 
Kohler Archives, box 68, folder 2; “History of Appointments to Labor Relations Boards in 
Wisconsin,” Gaylord Nelson Archives, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Nelson Archives), 
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understanding.  .  .  through collective bargaining.”  Local 407, City of LaCrosse Employees, 
wrote that the bill would provide “a fair means” to discuss problems.  Individual employees 
echoed Lawton’s emphasis on anti-union discrimination.  Highway employee Clayton Randorf 
explained that his co-workers had been “pushed around” for union activities.  Other smaller 
public sector unions, such as the Wisconsin County Police and Police Radio Operators 
Association, wrote Kohler in favor of the bill.  The Wisconsin Paid Firemen’s Association 
argued that the bill “is a natural for Wisconsin, which has long led the way” in progressive 
legislation.  Also, AFSCME president Zander wrote and telegraphed Kohler and even came to 
Madison to meet with him to promote the bill.53
Opponents—including many local government officials and their organizations—replied 
with arguments ranging from the old fears of police strikes and divided loyalty, to concerns 
about local control, to more technical legal issues.  Oliver Grootemaat, president of the Village 
of Whitefish Bay, objected that the “mere elimination of one phrase could grant municipal 
employees the right to strike” and that permitting police to organize “might place them in the 
anomalous position of being called upon to police a strike called by a brother union.”  Similarly, 
the mayor of Wausau, Herbert Giese, argued that it was “very bad public policy” to permit police 
to organize, because in a strike the labor movement would pressure police to favor the striking 
union.  The League of Municipalities, explicitly citing the Boston police strike (of more than 
box 107, folder 2.
53AFSCME Local 407 to Kohler, July 2, 1951, Kohler Archives, box 77, folder 5; Leo 
Flaherty (Wisconsin County Police) to Kohler, July 11, 1951, id.; Clayton Randorf to Kohler, id.; 
see, e.g., Petition to Kohler by Green Bay employees, April 10, 1951, id., folder 6; Zander 
telegraph to Kohler, July 19, 1951, id.; Zander letter to Kohler, June 22, 1951, id.; Bob Madden 
(Paid Firemen) to Kohler, June 21, 1951, id.
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thirty years earlier) added that allowing police to organize would undermine the “democratic 
system” which “depends upon the unbiased and impartial enforcement of laws.”  Another 
opponent claimed that allowing police to join the labor movement would be the same as 
“unionization of the army.”  The League added another argument that would be central in future 
debates: the state should not legislate in this area, but rather local officials should have complete 
authority in labor matters.  Indeed, the League argued, the bill would violate home rule 
provisions of state laws.  The League and others also raised delegation concerns about anything 
approaching bargaining.  But the police issue was central.  A memo to Attorney General 
Thomson stated that the main practical effect of the bill would be to allow police to organize, and 
added that “there is a strong sentiment in many sections of the country against” this.54
Kohler vetoed the bill, objecting to the affiliation of police with labor and specifically 
citing the need for police to maintain order in labor disputes.  The Union News put the best spin 
it could on this, stressing Kohler’s remark that “for the overwhelming majority of state and local 
employees, the present laws and customs embrace the privilege of belonging to labor unions.” 
Kohler’s objection was only to unionizing “employees in the uniformed services.”55
But while concerns about police, strikes, and the proper extent and enforceability of 
bargaining rights remained, law and reality were becoming even more out of sync.  The 
54Oliver Grootemaat to Kohler, July 2, 1951, id.; Herbert Giese to Kohler, id., folder 6; 
Frederick MacMillin to Kohler, July 2, 1951, 1, 2, id.; Cyrus Philipp to Kohler, June 14, 1951, 
id.; Memo from B. Lampert to Thomson, June 27, 1951, id.
55Union News, May-June 1951,1; Cling, 338.
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WCCME continued to grow, its locals continued to engage in limited negotiations, and the 
WERB continued to help settle disputes in some public sector cases.56
B. The 1953 Bill and the Delegation Problem:  Reform Meets Outmoded Legal
Doctrine.
AFSCME’s attempts in the next legislative session in 1953 foundered on the shoals of the 
non-delegation doctrine.  Beyond this legal objection, AFSCME also faced a rough political 
terrain.  In 1952, Kohler had been re-elected with 63 percent of the vote, the largest margin of 
victory to that date in Wisconsin history.  Further, the Union News described the 1953 legislature 
as “generally unfavorable.  .  .  toward public employees and toward labor generally.”57
Nonetheless, on February 11, 1953, the WCCME introduced Bill 210-S, which provided 
that contracts between local government employers and unions with durations of up to one year 
would be enforceable.  “The biggest problem in public employment,” Lawton concluded in a 
report to the WERB, was “the lack of machinery for effective negotiations.”58  But the entire 
concept of public sector negotiations was still suspect due to the non-delegation doctrine.  The 
delegation doctrine held that collective bargaining with a union unconstitutionally delegated 
56SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS, 173.
57Union News, May-June 1953, 1.  See, e.g., id.,  Nov.-Dec. 1951, 3 (“negotiations” bring 
gains in Polk, Vernon, and LaCrosse Counties); id., Nov.-Dec. 1953, 3 (WERB hearing in 
Antigo City wage dispute).
58JOURNAL OF THE SENATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 71ST SESSION OF THE WISCONSIN 
LEGISLATURE (1953), 202; WISCONSIN SENATE BILLS, 1953, WLRB; Union News, May-June 
1953, 4; Cling, 338-40 (quoting Lawton).
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sovereign decision-making power to a private party–a union.  A number of courts had used this 
doctrine to block even limited bargaining in the public sector.59
The WCCME and other unions, including private sector labor bodies, once again squared 
off against private and public employers in the League of Municipalities, the County Boards 
Association, the Wisconsin Manufacturers Association, and the state Chamber of Commerce.  
This time, opponents took a legalistic tack.  The state senate solicited an opinion on the bill from 
state Attorney General Thomson.  Thomson said that the bill was probably unconstitutional on 
non-delegation grounds because it would allow contracts that would restrict the discretion of 
legislative bodies regarding governmental functions.  Compensation of public workers was “a 
legislative function” which “may not be surrendered or delegated” to private parties.   Issues of 
“wages and hours of employment–and probably most other working conditions normally dealt 
with in collective bargaining agreements–involve the exercise of legislative functions.”  Shortly 
after receiving this opinion, the Senate indefinitely postponed the bill on a vote of seventeen to 
fifteen.  Most of the votes to kill the bill came from Republicans.60
59See, e.g., Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945) (city could 
not bargain a dues check-off provision, because “city authorities cannot delegate their continuing 
discretion” over labor relations); Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 
741 (Ct. App. 1946) (reversing a lower court ruling that permitted city workers to bargain 
collectively, because the authority of public officials “may not be delegated or surrendered to 
others, since it is public property”); see generally Slater, PUBLIC WORKERS, chap. 4. 
60Hearing Records, 1953, SB 129-271, WLRB.  Vernon Thomson to the Senate, May 5, 
1953, Legislative Drafting Records, Bill 210-S, WLRB; 42 OAG 97 (1953).  JOURNAL OF THE 
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C. Intensified Struggle, Compromise Results: the 1955 Bill Calls for a Study.
The 1955 round of the battle produced at best a draw in the form of a promise to study 
the issue.  At the same time, the political struggle began to heat up.  Kohler was re-elected in 
1954, but this time with only 51 percent of the vote.61   The WCCME increased its political 
activities.  In December 1954, it held a legislative conference that attracted 150 delegates from 
various unions to discuss strategies.  The WCCME tried to craft a compromise with the League 
of Municipalities, but the process broke down over whether a law should cover police, impasse 
resolution (AFSCME wanted alternative mechanisms in exchange for a strike ban), and the 
League’s insistence that a state law would violate home rule.  Still, the League took this matter 
seriously, cautioning local officials that to “avoid state interference in this essentially local 
matter,” they must prove both willing and able “to handle their labor problems at home.”62
The WCCME introduced Bill 89-S on January 27, 1955.  Like the 1951 bill, Bill 89-S 
granted the right to organize and engage in “collective considerations” with employers, made 
employer interference with such rights unfair labor practices, and provided for WERB 
conciliation.  Proponents of the bill at the hearings included an even greater range of private and 
public sector unionists from the CIO and the AFL.  Again, the League of Municipalities, the 
County Boards Association, and the Chamber of Commerce led the opposition.  Three key 
amendments were adopted to address the concerns of opponents.  First, the WCCME reluctantly 
agreed to exclude law enforcement.  Second, the concept of “collective considerations” was 
SENATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 71ST SESSION, 1079; Cling, 341.
61Kohler Archives, Finding Aid, 2; Thompson, 604.
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replaced with the phrase “better relations with unions through conferences and negotiations.” 
Third, a clause was added stating explicitly that the law did not grant a right to strike.63
Both sides stressed points they believed would be politically appealing.  Union opponents 
argued that “home rule” principles should give individual public employers the discretion to ban 
unions.  The WCCME stressed that anti-union discrimination was wrong and that the bill would 
only “interfere” with home rule to the extent that local governments were engaged in such 
discrimination.  Nor did the bill create a right to strike.  The Chamber of Commerce pushed the 
“divided loyalty” point, arguing that government, which was responsible for regulating business 
and labor, was already pressured by private sector unions, and that such pressures should not 
come from within the government as well.  The Milwaukee Journal focused its opposition on the 
concept of “negotiations.” Public workers already had sufficient influence, the paper objected; in 
Milwaukee, they “sit in on discussions of wages, working conditions and other problems.” 
Further, bargaining was incompatible with civil service rules.64
The senate rejected Bill 89-S on June 24, 1955, although the WCCME salvaged an 
agreement providing for a study.  Joint Resolution 81-S stated that in view of the controversies 
over the  rights of public workers to organize, whether the state should provide machinery for 
handling bargaining impasses, and the related constitutional and policy questions, the Legislative 
62Union News, Nov.-Dec. 1953, 1; id., Nov.-Dec. 1954, 1, 2.
63Bill 89-S, WISCONSIN SENATE BILLS, 1955, WLRB; A Substitute Amendment No. 1 to 
Bill 89-S, id.; “Bill History,” 1955 Hearing Records, SB 2-142, id.; Amendment No. 2-S to Bill 
89-S, id.; Cling, 342-43.
64Union News, Jan-Feb. 1955, 1; Cling, 343-345 (quoting Milwaukee Journal).
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Council should investigate and make a report to the 1957 legislature.  The League of 
Municipalities and Chamber of Commerce opposed even this, but it passed anyway.65
The WCCME bemoaned the power of its “two toughest opponents”:  the Chamber and 
the League, the latter of which was  fighting “against granting some meager rights to its own 
employees.”  Further, labor as a whole was increasingly dissatisfied with Governor Kohler and 
the Republicans.  The president of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor declared that the 1955 
session featured “the worst legislature since Wisconsin was incorporated as a state.”  Still, 
AFSCME optimistically noted that the WERB’s Advisory Committee had approved of Bill 89-S, 
and their opinion “should have some weight with the Legislative Council.”66
D. Opponents of Reform Fight Back:  The 1956 Study and the Attempt to Ban 
Public Sector Unions.
Both sides jockeyed over the study, seeking political advantage.  The Union News
stressed that government workers “were the only major group of employees in the state of 
Wisconsin that has not been granted collective bargaining rights.”  The Chamber of Commerce 
replied with claims of divided loyalty:  Public sector organizing was “a threat to maintaining 
governmental functions available to all our people.  .  .  .  Loyalty of a public employee must be 
to all the people and should never be simply to a labor official or organization.”  The Chamber 
also warned that labor’s political power would only increase with the merged AFL-CIO.67
65JOURNAL OF THE SENATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 72ND SESSION OF THE WISCONSIN 
LEGISLATURE (1955), 1702; Union News, May-June 1955, 1, 3.
66Union News, May-June 1955, 1, 2, 3, 4; HAFERBECKER, 178; THOMPSON, 604, 662-65.
67Union News, July-Aug. 1955, 1, 2; id., Aug. 1956, 2; id. , Jan. 1957, 1; Cling, 346-47 & 
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The debate turned much nastier, however, after a few public workers engaged in some 
secondary activity in support of a private sector strike, prompting opponents to call for a ban on 
all public sector unions.  In July 1955, during a strike by private sector workers at the Kohler 
Company, some municipal employees at the Milwaukee docks represented by AFSCME 
temporarily refused to unload some goods destined for Kohler.  Ship owners filed secondary 
boycott charges under the NLRA, but the National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges 
on the grounds that the NLRA did not apply to the public sector.  In reaction, on August 6, 1956, 
the Chamber of Commerce called on the Legislative Council to recommend laws that would bar 
public workers from forming AFL-CIO affiliated unions.  Chamber representative Joseph Fagan 
used this event to bolster his argument that public workers “should owe their loyalty to all the 
people and not simply the big merged AFL-CIO.”68
The Union News responded that the Chamber was “attempting to get revenge” and “to 
cripple public employee unions.”  The secondary action was an “isolated case.”  Lawton 
predicted the Chamber’s proposal would be “soundly rebuffed” by the legislature.  Needling, he 
noted that AFSCME would never propose legislation denying businessmen the right to form 
their own organizations.  The Public Employee added that Fagan’s name “sounds like that of a 
Dickens villain.”  Still, labor took the threat seriously, and marshaled considerable forces against 
it.  George Haberman, president of the Wisconsin Federation of Labor, wrote a public letter 
insisting that “the labor movement feels very strongly that public employees should be given the 
n.33 (quoting Chamber of Commerce).
68Union News, Sept. 1956, 1 (quoting News Release dated Aug.  6, 1956); id., Oct. 1956, 
4; Cling, 347-48, 711-19.  See generally, WALTER UPHOFF, KOHLER ON STRIKE: THIRTY YEARS 
OF CONFLICT (1966).
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legal right to organize and bargain collectively,” and the Wisconsin Federation passed a 
resolution pledging to “exert constant efforts” to enact laws to rectify the “discriminatory, unfair, 
and un-American” legal status of public workers.  Charles Schultz, president of the state CIO, 
also publicly pledged “wholehearted support.”  AFSCME Locals and national officers, including 
President Zander, promised to help fight the Chamber’s “vicious attack.”69
Opponents displayed equal fervor.  The Chamber issued a memo on November 20, 1956, 
the day the Legislative Committee released its report, asking for a statewide referendum during 
the April 1957 elections on the right to organize.  “We are convinced that the Wisconsin people 
will overwhelmingly support a prohibition of AFL-CIO affiliated labor unions in Wisconsin 
government.”  The memo emphasized “THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT.”  Revealing the worries of some private employers, 
Fagan added that the AFL-CIO merger would mean that labor would be “nearly a third party,” 
which “could mean the end of our capitalistic system.”  The League of Municipalities took a 
more moderate and more successful tack, again stressing that the unionization of municipal 
workers was a local concern, not a matter for state legislation.  Robert Sundby, the League’s 
legal counsel, also told the Legislative Council that municipal labor relations were generally 
good and thus no law granting rights to unions was needed.70
69PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Jan. 1957, 14; Union News, Sept. 1956, 1, 3; id., Oct. 1956, 1, 2, 3; 
id., Nov. 1956, 1, 2, 3-4.
70Union News, Jan. 1957, 1, 3; Cling, 348-349.
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The Legislative Council’s report of November 20, 1956, reflected contemporary attitudes 
that increasingly tolerated public sector unions, but had not yet worked out what rights they 
should have.  The Council noted that in Wisconsin, government employees (except, in some 
cases, police) were usually allowed to form unions.   Prohibiting all public workers from joining 
unions would be “unreasonable and extreme.”  But, the report continued, while “agreements” 
with these unions were legal, “contracts” were not; exclusive bargaining, compulsory arbitration, 
strikes, and pickets could not be permitted in public employment; and “no serious state-wide 
problem” existed in government labor relations.  Also, as the League had argued, the Council 
concluded that because the “home rule principle” had produced “generally satisfactory labor 
relations.  .  .  , state dictation of a labor policy would be unwise.”71
The Union News promised that AFSCME would “continue to press for legislation” and 
that “political action at the local level will ultimately give us success!” Lawton emphasized that 
“the only remedy.  .  .  is a political one.”72
E. Partisan Politics:  The 1957 Bill Is Tabled.
The year 1957 saw more delays, but an increasing probability that reform could happen 
through political action.  In 1957, the WCCME tried compromising from the start by excluding 
law enforcement.  Otherwise, Bill 235-S was familiar.  It provided the rights to organize and be 
represented by unions “in conferences and negotiations” with employers about “wages, hours, 
71Governmental Labor Relations Committee Report, Nov. 20, 1956, Nelson Archives 
Box 22, Folder 5; Union News, Jan. 1957, 1; id., Feb. 1957, 1, 4.
72Union News, Jan.1957, 2, 3; id., Feb. 1957, 2, 4.
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and conditions of employment.”  The WERB could appoint conciliators and then fact-finders to 
help resolve disputes.  Again, Lawton appealed to evolving sensibilities.  The bill was necessary 
because “a substantial minority” of employers opposed unionization through “threats of 
discharge, demotion, and other forms of discrimination.”  Again, the main opposition came from 
the League of Municipalities, the County Boards Association, and the Chamber of Commerce.73
The bill was killed in committee by a highly partisan vote.  A motion to release the bill to 
the full senate failed seventeen votes to fifteen, with all seventeen “nays” coming from 
Republicans (ten of the fifteen “ayes” came from Democrats).  The WCCME now turned its full 
attention to politics.  “If we ever needed proof that political organization and political action are 
absolutely necessary,” WCCME executive director Oberbeck fumed, this “Chamber of 
Commerce dominated legislature” provided it.  The Union News listed the votes of senators on 
the bill, telling its readers:  “Study it carefully!  Find out who is friend and who is foe.  Clip it out 
and carry it in your billfold.  When you see your state senator, pull out the roll call to see how he 
voted.”74
Crucially, the WCCME was finally in a position both to help cause political change at the 
state level and to take advantage of it.  “Public employees are steadily growing in influence,” the 
Union News noted.  “With each succeeding legislative session we are listened to with a more 
attentive ear.”  A more objective source, the Waukesha Freeman, observed in late 1957 that the 
“public employees of Wisconsin are beginning to flex their political muscles” and were 
73Union News, May 1957, 2; id., July 1957, 2; id., April 1957, 1, 4.
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“organized more effectively each year.”  The “public employee lobby can be a formidable one.”  
AFSCME focused on elections.  In October 1958, Oberbeck, protesting anti-union firings in a 
county highway department, insisted that the legislation was the only solution.  With the 
following month’s elections obviously in mind, he recalled the veto of the 1951 bill by “your 
present governor” and later bills blocked by “influential opponents in the legislature.”  He told 
AFSCME supporters to ask their representatives about organizing and collective bargaining 
rights.  If a representative was opposed, “don’t vote for him.”  The Union News regularly urged 
similar political action.  “With this kind of activity at the local level,” the Union News concluded 
prophetically, “we will succeed in the 1959 session of the legislature.”75
III.  The 1959 Law:  Democrats in Power and Reform at Last.
A. The 1959 Bill Becomes Law.
The elections of 1958 produced a key change in this long drama.  For the first time in 
decades, Wisconsin elected a Democratic governor, Gaylord Nelson, and a Democratic state 
assembly.  Nelson defeated Vernon Thomson, who had succeeded Kohler.  Nelson was much 
more friendly toward unions than his predecessors had been.  He had worked in Lawton’s law 
firm and served as a field representative for the WCCME.  The Public Employee enthused that 
Nelson had “compiled an outstanding record as a legislator.”  For example, unlike Kohler, 
Nelson had opposed “right to work” laws.  Further, 1958 was the first time Democrats had won a 
majority in the state assembly since 1932.  Indeed, from 1947 and 1957, Republicans had at least 
74Union News, July 1957, 1, 2.
75Union News, Feb. 1958, 4: id., Oct. 1958, 1; id., Oct. 1957, 1.
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a two-thirds majority in both houses of the state legislature in every year except 1955, when they 
held “only” sixty-four of the assembly’s one hundred seats.  Now Democrats had a fifty-five to 
forty-five advantage in the assembly.  Democrats also won back the offices of lieutenant 
governor, attorney general, and state treasurer.  They even gained three state senate seats, 
although Republicans retained a twenty to thirteen majority there.76
Sudden and important as the political shift was, the forces driving it had long been in 
motion, and unions were a central factor.  State Republicans had been increasingly divided over 
issues ranging from legislative reapportionment (along “one person, one vote” lines) to anti-
communism, and riven by internal factions.  In 1958, Thomson was saddled with Republican 
support of the unpopular ideas of creating a sales tax and making Wisconsin a “right to work” 
state, along with a recession in which 90,000 Wisconsinites had lost their jobs.  Meanwhile, by 
the mid-1950s the Democrats had become revitalized, with the help of former Progressive 
Republicans, including Nelson and future Democratic attorney general John Reynolds, and also 
labor.  Democrats were increasingly successful at fusing their pro-labor ideals with a sizeable 
portion of Wisconsin’s farm vote.  The 1954 election produced the largest gains for the 
Democrats since the end of the war.  In 1957, E. William Proxmire won the special election for 
76THOMPSON, 676-77, 528, 534; LARRY SWOBODA AND GAIL SCHNEIDER, THE IMPACT 
AND EFFECT OF THE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW UPON WISCONSIN’S 
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ENVIRONMENT: ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (1988) (available from the WLRB), 53; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Dec., 
1958, 5; Gaylord Nelson to W. J. Tanking, Jr., Sept. 10, 1962, Nelson Archives, box 22, folder 5.
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senator to replace Joe McCarthy after his death.  Proxmire was Wisconsin’s first Democratic 
senator since 1939, and the Democratic party had returned to respectability.77
Unions provided crucial money and manpower to these Democratic victories.  In the mid-
1950s, labor contributed from 25 to 33 percent of the money received by the state party, union 
political action committees made additional independent expenditures, and labor provided the 
mass of volunteers in voter registration drives and phone banks.  “The triumph of the Democratic 
party in the late 1950s would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, without these various 
contributions of the unions,” Thompson explains.78
Labor also helped turn the growth in the cities and decline in the farm population into a 
political advantage through reapportionment.  Wisconsin was one of only two states at the time 
that gave equal weight to urban and rural districts.  Thus in 1950, while Wisconsin’s urban areas 
held 55 percent of the population, a working majority in both state legislative houses still 
represented rural areas.  Large farm interests were often suspicious of unions, and urban 
Republicans tended to be less anti-labor.  Powerful Republican Assemblyman Alfred Ludvigsen, 
representing the rural northen half of Waukesha County, complained that “both Republicans and 
Democrats elected in the big cities vote for labor bills.”  Tensions around legislative 
reapportionment heightened in the 1950s as urban areas grew by nearly 26 percent while the 
77THOMPSON, 52, 528-29, 538-553, 560-70, 669, 602-11; 671-73.
78THOMPSON, 662-65.
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rural population grew by only 1 percent.  Finally, after various battles, a reapportionment plan 
was adopted based on population, becoming effective with the election of the 1955 legislature.79
Meanwhile, the WCCME continued to try to devise an acceptable public sector statute, 
learning from its past defeats.  In late 1958, it held a legislative conference that called for 
bargaining rights for all local government workers except law enforcement.  The WERB could 
engage in mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, arbitration, or other services, if both parties 
consented.  The WCCME stressed the reasonableness of its proposal.  It would be unfair to ban 
strikes without some alternative for settling negotiating disputes.  Basic organizing and 
bargaining rights did not usurp the government’s sovereignty, Oberbeck insisted, and 
“sovereign” power should be accountable “to the people it represents.”  Lawton noted that the 
WERB had already successfully conducted elections and offered non-binding mediation and 
arbitration in the public sector, and thus it could safely be given such powers in a statute.80
Democratic victories did not ensure enactment of AFSCME’s agenda.  Even those 
generally sympathetic to public sector unions were unsure of the scope of formal rights that 
should be granted, and powerful forces still opposed any such rights.  Thus AFSCME’s Bill 309-
A, introduced on February 26, 1959, contained compromises designed to help it pass.  To 
counter objections of unconstitutional delegation and improper state control over local 
governments, the bill specified that the WERB would have the power to conduct representation 
79Id., 641, 661, 177, 644, 226-29, 645-52; HAFERBECKER, 188.
80Union News, Dec. 1958, 1; id., Jan. 1959, 1, 2; Madison Union Labor News, Dec. 1958, 
16.
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elections and do mediation and voluntary arbitrations only if both parties agreed.  The bill again 
excluded public safety personnel.  Beyond that, it again provided for the right to organize and the 
right for unions to engage in “conferences and negotiations” about “wages, hours, and conditions 
of employment.”  A modified version of the bill became law, but only after a lengthy struggle.81
AFSCME took advantage of new attitudes by characterizing traditional objections as 
outdated.  After the Milwaukee Sentinel complained that collective bargaining would “mark the 
end of unprivileged, non-partisan government,” Zander replied that “like those who once 
opposed child-labor laws and social security, the men of little minds today are fighting a rear-
guard action.”  State senator Kirby Hendee (R-Milwaukee) introduced Bill 47-S, which would 
have mandated harsh penalties for strikers, and the Union News turned this into an argument for 
AFSCME’s bill.  Any such law that did not provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
“is not fair.  A union must have a way of getting its grievances and requests acted upon.” 
AFSCME again made the moderate argument that the bill was needed because “a substantial 
minority” continued to discriminate against union supporters.82
The hearings on the bills were hotly contested, with unusually large numbers registering 
in favor and in opposition.83  It soon appeared that the WCCME’s bill was more viable than 
Hendee’s: more than 150 people registered in favor of it and around 45 registered against it; 
81Bill 309-A, WISCONSIN ASSEMBLY BILLS, 1959, WLRB; Substitute Amendment No. 1-
A to Bill No.  309-A, id.; Union News, March 1959, 2.  The 1959 legislative session was the 
longest on record at that time.  THOMPSON, 677.
82PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, March 1959, 3; Union News, Feb. 1959, 1, 2, 4; id., April 1957, 4.
83
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whereas only nine registered in favor of Hendee’s bill and 85 registered against it.  Lawton 
argued that the issues were whether public employers could discriminate against pro-union 
workers, and whether public employees could have dispute-resolution machinery.   The 
Wisconsin AFL-CIO strongly supported the WCCME’s bill.84
The WCCME was willing to make further compromises.  The WERB’s Advisory 
Committee was initially evenly split on the bill, with the six labor representatives favoring it and 
the six employer representatives in opposition.  But after WERB chair Laurence Gooding said 
that a majority would support the bill if clauses were added providing for union unfair labor 
practices and stating that employees had the right to refrain from union activities, the WCCME 
quickly agreed to such amendments.85
AFSCME focused its rhetoric on the politically popular right of association and 
intensified its efforts on the ground.  Public employers in the League of Municipalities and the 
County Boards Association had organized, AFSCME argued; how could they maintain that it 
was “unconstitutional, morally wrong, and bad “ for public workers to do likewise?  In senate 
testimony, Lawton cited cases of anti-union discrimination and again stressed the need for 
dispute resolution machinery.  Oberbeck urged political action, sensing victory.  “Now is the 
time for every union member .  .  .  to buttonhole their assemblyman and senator and tell him that 
you want favorable action on bill 309-A.”  Pointing out that legislators were usually home at 
84Union News, April 1959, 1, 2.
85Gooding to Allen Flannigan, April 6, 1959, 1959 Drafting Records, Chaps. 505-09, 
WLRB; Union News, May 1959, 1, 3.
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weekends, Oberbeck suggested that members “[g]et your legislative committee or your whole 
local together and make a trip over to your legislator’s home” to discuss the bill.  Indeed, a 
history of Wisconsin labor states that “[l]egislators at home on weekends were deluged with 
visits by the local public employees” supporting the bill.  Oberbeck also recommended a letter-
writing campaign.  The WCCME was “standing on the threshold of a new era” and this 
legislative “Bill of Rights” was its “top goal.”86
The League of Municipalities countered with its own moderate and previously successful 
arguments.  The League claimed it did not oppose unionization per se, but state powers over 
local governments in this area were both bad policy and unconstitutional.  “State control” by the 
WERB represented “unwarranted interference with municipal employee labor relations.”  The 
“prospect of an elected municipal official being called by subpoena to justify the exercise of his 
legislative discretion before a state agency” in a ULP hearing was “completely repugnant.”  
While mediation and arbitration were voluntary under the bill, the League (correctly) predicted 
that unions would later try to make such procedures mandatory.  The League also cited former 
attorney general Thomson’s opinion that “there was grave doubt of the constitutionality” of 
collective bargaining.  The mediation and arbitration provisions were also unconstitutional 
delegations, because while engaging in the process was voluntary, the results would be binding, 
and Thomson’s opinion had disapproved of restricting the “free exercise of discretion” of public 
officials in labor matters.  Pay and working conditions of public employees were “legislative 
functions” that could not be delegated.  The League publicized a Milwaukee Journal editorial 
86Union News, April 1959, 4; id., May 1959, 1, 4; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, June 1959, 11; 
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predicting (correctly) that  unions would use this bill “as a wedge” for further bargaining rights, 
“which the courts have consistently held to be beyond the authority” of local governments.  
Various local public employers echoed these complaints.  Racine’s city counsel wrote Nelson 
that he had “very serious doubt as to the constitutionality” of the bill; further, it was “one step 
closer to recognition of the right of public employees to strike.”87
The bill passed, albeit after further concessions.  The original bill carried by a vote of 67 
to 23 in the assembly, with all dissenting votes cast by Republicans.  On July 23, the senate 
adopted a Republican amendment deleting the provisions authorizing the WERB to aid in 
elections, bargaining impasses, and arbitration of grievances.  However, the senate rejected an 
amendment by Hendee that would have provided for harsh penalties for strikers.  With the 
powers of the state agency WERB reduced, the delegation issue was apparently sufficiently 
diluted.  The amended bill passed by 23 to 10 in the senate and then passed the assembly on a 
voice vote.  Governor Nelson, who had always supported the bill, signed it into law on 
September 22.  Attorney General Reynolds later told AFSCME that this law was won through 
labor’s organization and efforts, but the friendly administration was crucial, as were various 
ROBERT OZANNE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN (1984), 75.
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compromises, and, more broadly, the evolution in public attitudes caused in part by the actual 
activities of public sector labor on the ground.88
AFSCME was jubilant over this seminal legal victory.  Employees of local governments 
(excluding police) for the first time anywhere had a statewide statutory right to organize and be 
represented by unions in “conferences and negotiations” over wages, hours, and working 
conditions.   The Union News enthused that “the bill caps a long fight . . . to win for city and 
county workers the same rights enjoyed by workers in private employment.”  The law opened an 
“enlightened era.”  The national AFSCME lauded this “collective bargaining bill” that forbade 
public employers from impeding the right to organize.  Speaking mostly for private sector 
unions, the Madison Union Labor News cheered that “[p]ublic employees of Wisconsin have 
finally gained the right to join a union.  .  .  without interference from their employers.”  But 
mindful of the significant compromises as to impasse and enforcement procedures, the WCCME 
began looking ahead.  The “legislative wheels in Wisconsin have been grinding for the last 13 
years” on these issues, the Union News  observed.  “Whether the Legislature has ground fine 
enough may arouse considerable debate.”89
88Amendment No. 1-S to Bill No. 309-A and Substitute Amendment No. 1-2 to Bill No. 
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B. Using the New Law:  Victories and Discontents.
The 1959 law was a historical landmark that spurred innovations in other states and 
facilitated improved labor relations in Wisconsin.  Still, reflecting ongoing ambivalence about 
the proper extent of union rights for public workers, it was still woefully unclear on the extent of 
such rights.  At first, bargaining seemed to be a success.  In January 1960, the Union News
claimed that negotiations under the bill “have produced the expected gratifying results” and that 
the law had promoted bargaining even where none had existed before. The Public Employee
reported “considerable gains through negotiations completed by 94 locals” in Wisconsin in a 
variety of areas involving wages, hours, and conditions.90
But this was quite different from bargaining in the traditional private sector sense, and 
public sector unions in Wisconsin still relied in substantial measure on the good will of the local 
public employer.  For example, the mayor of Madison, Ivan Nestingen, explained how 
bargaining worked in that city.  A city bargaining committee negotiated with the union, and then 
a separate council of five aldermen made final decisions after considering the results of that 
bargaining.  While the city negotiated over pay, benefits, leave, medical insurance, and dues 
check-off, it refused to bargain about promotions or what it termed “employment practices.”  
News, July 1959, 2, 4.
90Union News, Jan. 1960, 1, 4; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, June 1960, 21; id., April 1960, 21-22.  
Those subjects included wages, benefits, hours, leave, seniority rights, grievance procedures, 
“maintenance of membership” union security agreements, and dues check-off.  Id.
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Bargaining resulted in an “agreement,” but not a written contract, because Madison’s city 
attorney had indicated that written labor contracts were still illegal under current law.91
Given these limits and ambiguities, it is not surprising that Oberbeck was soon 
complaining that “the law is not clear as to what the collective bargaining relationship should 
be.”  Again, AFSCME’s answer was political:  revised legislation that clarified procedures on 
bargaining and recognition.  Oberbeck suggested that formal, written contracts should be the 
norm, demurring that any “question of legality” of such contracts “is a purely academic one.”  
The Union News urged locals to insist on written agreements.  Far from a legal problem, they 
were merely a “written record of what has been agreed to,” analogous to a bank statement.  Also, 
the WCCME called for amendments to specify enforcement and administrative procedures.  
Although provisions regarding the WERB had been removed, that body would still sometimes 
intervene in public sector matters.  For example, in 1960, the WERB successfully mediated a 
dispute over wages and hours between the Green County Highway Committee and AFSCME 
Local 226.   WERB member Arvid Anderson also called for amendments to clarify the WERB’s 
authority in the public sector.  The law “should be undergirded with enforcement procedures 
either in a circuit court, or before this agency, and not left in a nebulous fashion.”92
Meanwhile, opponents of reform felt the law had already gone too far, and they now 
looked to the 1960 governor’s race.  In the fall of 1960, Nelson’s opponent, Philip Kuehn, issued 
91Union News, Jan. 1961, 1, 3, 4.
92Union News, July 1960, 1, 3; id., Sept. 1960, 1, 3; id., March 1960, 1; Arvid Anderson 
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a position paper that opposed all public sector bargaining, called for punitive measures for public 
sector strikers (as in the old Hendee bill), and opposed extending organizing rights to public 
safety workers.  Adopting older visions of labor relations, Kuehn insisted that there could be no 
right to bargain with the government because there was no right to strike against the government.  
He even added that public workers beyond police and fire should be denied the right to organize 
“in other situations” that risked “divided loyalty.”93
AFSCME fought back in the court of public opinion:  “wealthy.  .  .  men like Kuehn” 
wanted to make “the working man.  .  .  a second class citizen.”  Lawton stressed new 
understandings born in the public sector:  the term “negotiations” in the 1959 law meant a type 
of bargaining, and bargaining could exist without strikes.  For example, arbitration could be used 
to resolve bargaining impasses, as the ABA had suggested.  Lawton vowed that AFSCME would 
propose amendments in 1961 that would strengthen bargaining by providing for mediation, 
conciliation, and fact-finding by the WERB.  Nelson and Reynolds also argued that the WERB 
should be more involved in the public sector, and that the legislature should clarify that the 
WERB could normally be used in elections or ULP cases.  Rejecting fears that organizing or 
even bargaining necessarily meant strikes, Nelson added that the 1959 law did not provide a right 
to strike, and if Kuehn wanted “jail sentences, I disagree.”94
In a sense, both Kuehn and AFSCME were wrestling with the same fundamental issue: 
what should happen after a bargaining impasse if the union is not allowed to strike.  Kuehn 
93Union News, Sept. 1960, 1-3.
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argued that with no right to strike, “collective bargaining is robbed of its mutuality,” and 
therefore bargaining was impossible.  AFSCME was also frustrated with a law that authorized 
“negotiations” but provided no method to resolve impasses.  Modern public sector labor law 
provides a variety of answers to that question,95 but the Wisconsin experience was the first 
attempt to deal with the issue seriously.
Still, AFSCME rightly claimed confidence in its political power as the November 
elections neared.  Asserting that public sector labor rights would be one of the hottest issues in 
the election, the Union News concluded as to Kuehn that it was “a poor sailor indeed who does 
not knoweth which way the wind bloweth.”  AFSCME portrayed Kuehn’s program as a key 
example of why public workers should be politically active: if Kuehn were elected and the 
Republicans retained their senate majority, it would mean “second-class citizenship.”  Wisconsin 
had 25,000 organized government workers, the Union News claimed, and “every public 
employee in the state must be at the polls” to vote “for candidates who are in favor of an 
enlightened labor policy for public employees.”  Governor Nelson, the Union News noted, was a 
“friend of the public employee.96
Nelson won a second term as governor in 1960 and Reynolds won a second term as 
attorney general.  But Republican Warren Knowles recaptured the lieutenant governorship, the 
94Union News, Sept. 1960, 1-2, 4.
95Modern public sector law features a variety of impasse resolution mechanisms, 
featuring various combinations of voluntary or mandatory fact-finding, mediation, and binding 
and non-binding arbitration; some states even allow some public employees to strike.  RICHARD 
KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (3d ed. 2001), 45-80.
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Republicans retook the state assembly (fifty-five to forty-five), and they kept a twenty to thirteen 
majority in the senate.97  The stage was set for a battle over amendments to clarify the law, 
specifically over state powers in the area of bargaining impasses.
IV.  The 1962 Law and Continuing Debates in Public Sector Labor Relations.
A. The 1962 Law and State Enforcement.
The 1962 bill was designed to plug gaps in the 1959 law, and, along with that law, 
constitutes the first example of state legislators seriously grappling with specific, modern issues 
of public sector bargaining.
On March 2, 1961, the WCCME introduced Bill 336-A, the point of which was to grant 
the WERB formal authority to enforce union rights and aid in bargaining.  The original version 
of the bill provided that the WERB could act as a mediator or an arbitrator in bargaining.  To  
blunt criticisms based on non-delegation and home rule concerns, the bill specified that 
participation in arbitration would be voluntary, but WERB decisions in such voluntary 
proceedings would be binding.  Also, if negotiations reached an impasse, or if one side refused to 
bargain in good faith, either party could ask the WERB to name a fact-finder who would make 
recommendations.  The bill provided that these procedures would also apply to public safety 
personnel, including police.  Also, either side could petition the WERB to conduct a 
96Union News, Sept. 1960, 3, 4; id., Nov. 1960, 1, 4.
97THOMPSON, 697; SWOBODA AND SCHNEIDER, 61.
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representation election.  Finally, the bill explicitly authorized written contracts.98  Opponents 
again contested even this level of state involvement, resulting in another set of compromises that 
was, nonetheless, another historic victory for labor.
Governor Nelson and leading Democrats supported the bill.  Deputy Attorney General 
Nathan Heffernan explained that the absence of procedures to implement the rights in the 1959 
law had created confusion.  Still, opposition was fierce.  The assembly finally passed the bill by a 
vote of sixty-four to fifteen in July, after adopting an amendment that expressly prohibited 
strikes.  Attempting to avoid further amendments in the senate, Lawton argued that the bill was 
already modest:  employers were not required to sign contracts or engage in arbitration, and 
recommendations by fact-finders would be only advisory.  But the senate then added 
amendments which provided that arbitrations too would only advisory, and that fact-finding 
would be allowed only if both parties agreed to it.99
Neither side was entirely satisfied with the amended bill.  Lawton still wanted fact-
finding if either party requested it and binding arbitration if both sides were willing.  Meanwhile, 
opponents felt the bill violated principles of home rule and sovereignty.  The League again raised 
the specter of the WERB subpoenaing municipal officials, insisted that even voluntary, non-
98Bill 336-A, WISCONSIN ASSEMBLY BILLS, 1961, WLRB; Union News, March 1961, 1-
2.
99Union News, May 1961, 1-2; id., June-July 1961, 1; id., Sept. 1961, 1, 4; JOURNAL OF 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 75TH SESSION OF THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE (1961), 1623, 1703; 
Amendment No.  3-A to Bill 336-A, WISCONSIN ASSEMBLY BILLS, 1961; Amendment No. 1-A 
to Bill No. 336-A, id.; Substitute Amendment 1-S to Bill No. 336-A, id.; Lawton to Members of 
the Assembly, July 5, 1961, Legislative Drafting Records, Ch. 663, 1961, WLRB.
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binding arbitration was of questionable constitutionality and would cause “chaos and discord.”  
Various local public employers echoed that the bill would give the WERB too much power.  The 
Milwaukee Journal editorialized that the bill “ought to be killed,” because “[s]quaring 
government sovereignty with the realities of employee-employer relations poses problems.”  The 
Wisconsin State Journal decried AFSCME’s political power, adding that “[p]ublic and private 
employment are not the same and cannot be made so.”  The duties of public officials “cannot be 
delegated or shrugged off to some other body.”  The Milwaukee Government Service League 
objected that binding contracts violated the sovereign right of governments “to change their 
minds without restriction.”100  But opponents had no clear alternatives, and the tide of reform 
was too strong.
In contrast, labor succeeded by making specific, practical proposals and arguments.  As 
to the erosion of local authority, AFSCME responded that nothing in the bill prevented public 
employers from making final decisions in bargaining.  The bill did not require employers to 
submit to arbitration and, as amended, the employer was not bound by arbitration decisions.  
Local government already had to comply with state procedures in matters ranging from budgets 
to taxes to street design, so the limited requirements of the labor bill were constitutional.  The 
Union News published excerpts from a Wisconsin Law Review article written by Arvid 
Anderson.  Public sector unions would continue to grow, Anderson explained, and absent 
100Union News, Sept. 1961, 1; Lawton to the Assembly, “Analysis of Amendment No. 1-
A (n.d., 1961), Legislative Drafting Records, Ch. 663, 1961; Thelen to the Senate, July 21, 1961, 
id., (attaching articles from the Milwaukee Journal, July 15, 1961, and the Wisconsin State 
Journal, July 14, 1961); Thelen to the Assembly, July 6, 1961, id.; Ed Johnson (League of 
Municipalities) to the Senate (n.d., 1961), id.
55
adequate grievance and bargaining procedures, public sector labor disputes would increase.  He 
compared developments in the public sector to those in the private sector around the time the 
NLRA was passed.  Anderson suggested principles for state laws, mostly along the lines of what 
AFSCME was advocating.  Public sector unions should have the right to form written, binding, 
contracts.  Both unions and public employers should be required to bargain in good faith
concerning wages, hours, and working conditions.  Strikes should be barred, and the parties 
should instead use mediation, voluntary arbitrations, and advisory fact-finding.101
AFSCME’s political power was drawing notice.  The WCCME “may well become any 
day now the most potent of the lobbying forces in the state capitol,” wrote John Wyngaard, a 
correspondent for several Wisconsin newspapers, in an article titled “Public Employee Union 
Has Gained Real Political Power.”  As to the WCCME’s bill, the union “has won a resounding, 
even an embarrassingly decisive victory” in the assembly.  “A dozen years ago, the county 
boards could have knocked down such a rival power with scarcely a serious effort.”  But public 
sector unions have “grown rapidly and now represent a considerable voting power; they are well 
led; and they promise to grow even more powerful.”  Also contributing to the victory were the 
compromises made; the expanded clout of public and private sector labor generally; and more 
broadly, increased experience with public sector labor, which made it more difficult to link such 
unions with strikes, bias, or other old nightmarish scenarios.  In any case, the October 1961 
101Arvid Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 WIS. L. REV. 601, 629-
33; Union News, Sept. 1961, 2; id., Nov. 1961, 2.
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Public Employee called the new Wisconsin bill one of the most “enlightened labor legislation 
bills” ever, and predicted a “bitter, showdown fight.”102
Again, both sides were forced to compromise.  Thelen asked that the bill be deferred until 
the 1963 legislative session.  He cited editorials from relatively minor newspapers:  the Marinette 
Eagle Star (a “dangerous bill”) and the Appleton Post Crescent (“exhaustive study” still 
required).  Even the League acknowledged that the “pressures which have been brought to bear” 
to pass the bill “are well known.”  Still, opponents were able to attach further amendments, most 
importantly eliminating the arbitration provisions entirely.103
Thus, the final bill provided for WERB mediation only if both parties requested it, but 
allowed for WERB-conducted representation elections or fact-finding at the request of either 
party.  The fact-finder had the power to call hearings, issue subpoenas, and make non-binding 
recommendations.  Indicating how much the winds had shifted, the provision allowing coverage 
of public safety personnel was retained, apparently with little controversy.  The bill also required 
contracts to be in writing.  Strikes were “expressly prohibited,” but no penalties were specified.  
On January 10, 1962, the Legislature approved Bill 336-A, and Governor Nelson signed it on 
January 31.104
102Union News, Sept. 1961, 2, 3; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Oct. 1961, 2.
103Thelen to the Senate, Jan. 8, 1962, Legislative Drafting Records, Ch. 663, 1961; 
Johnson to the Senate, Jan. 8, 1962, id.
104Codified as Chapter 663 of the laws of 1961, amending subchapter IV of chapter 111 
(effective date, Feb. 6, 1962).  JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 75TH SESSION OF THE 
WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE, 2578; Union News, Jan. 2, 1962, 2; id., March 1962, 1.
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This law represented “the culmination of nearly 15 years’ work” by AFSCME, beginning 
with the defeat of the 1947 bill designed to punish strikers, Lawton proclaimed.  The 
amendments were “meaningless.”  While the WERB could act as a mediator in bargaining and 
ULP cases only if both parties agreed, effective mediation was only possible if both parties 
agreed anyway.  Further, either party could initiate fact-finding after a bargaining impasse or ask 
the WERB to conduct a representation election.  The WERB was not authorized to do 
arbitrations, but employers could still agree to arbitrations conducted by other neutrals, such as 
the American Arbitration Association.  “We gained our basic objectives,” he insisted.  Indeed, he 
called the new law “the Magna Carta for public employees” and said it meant as much as the 
NLRA did in private industry.  For years, opponents had been “crying that public employees 
should not have the right to strike,” the Union News exulted, but “they gave no alternative.”  The 
new law provides “a way to settle labor disputes successfully.  .  .  mediation and fact finding.”  
The Public Employee claimed the law provided “many of the collective bargaining rights now 
afforded workers in private industry.”  A later study concluded that this law “converted a 
statement of policy [the 1959 law] into a functional process for true collective bargaining.”105
AFSCME had arrived, politically.  Standing next to Governor Nelson at the signing 
ceremony were AFSCME national vice president Steven Clark, WCCME vice president Harmon 
Skown, and WCCME president Herb Einerson.  Other public officials curried AFSCME’s favor.  
At AFSCME’s state convention, Attorney General Reynolds hailed the law as a “giant step 
105Union News, Jan. 1962, 1-2, 4; id., May 1962, 1; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, Feb. 5, 1962, 1; 
Robert Krause, The Short, Troubled History of Wisconsin’s New Labor Law, 25 PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 302, 303 (1965).
58
forward” born of the WCCME’s “tireless” campaign.  “In the century-long struggle to protect the 
rights of workers to bargain collectively with their employers, our public employees have been 
ignored.  These new laws put Wisconsin in a leadership position in the nation.”  Reynolds was 
running for governor in the 1962 elections against Kuehn and would win, with AFSCME’s 
support.  A month before the election, Reynolds stated that the “objective of the law is to provide 
collective bargaining rights for municipal employees similar to that provided to employees in 
private industry.  With this objective I agree.”106
AFSCME linked the reform in Wisconsin law with an important victory at the national 
level.  On January 17, 1962, President John F.  Kennedy signed Federal Executive Order 10988, 
which gave limited bargaining rights to federal workers107  “The sea of public controversy over 
the right of the public employee to belong to a labor union has been lapping against the dike of 
adverse legislative and legal opinion in Wisconsin and throughout the United States,” the Union 
News proclaimed.  “The dike was breached in Wisconsin.  .  .  .  Recently, President Kennedy.  .  
.  breached the dike again.  .  .  .  The public employee movement is here to stay and thus must be 
dealt with realistically.”108
106Union News, March 1962, 1; id., May 1962, 2; id., Oct. 1962, 1.
107The executive order granted exclusive bargaining rights (over very limited topics) to a 
union chosen by a majority of employees in a bargaining unit; gave formal recognition to a union 
representing 10 percent of employees (entitling the union to consultation rights); and gave 
informal recognition to a union representing any employees (allowing it to express its views on 
policies affecting its members).  PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, April 6, 1962, 4; id., Sept. 7, 1962, 7.
108Union News, March 1962, 4; Krause, 302; PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, May-June 1961, 2.
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B. Results Under the 1962 Law and Beyond.
The WCCME quickly took advantage of various aspects of the new law, especially the 
WERB’s enforcement powers.  On July 27, 1962, the WERB told the Green Lake County 
Highway Commission to reinstate an employee fired because of anti-union discrimination.  The 
first fact-finder’s report involving AFSCME was issued on June 1, 1963, and the WCCME 
happily announced that it recommended a seven-cent per hour raise for Local 678, DePere City 
employees.   Bargaining was improving.  Oberbeck bragged that while in 1959 about 60 percent 
of WCCME’s locals had signed contracts, by the fall of 1964 almost all had.  Other public sector 
unions in Wisconsin, such as the American Federation of Teachers, also took advantage of the 
new law.109
AFSCME did encounter the limits of the new law as well, and fights over the scope of 
rights would continue for decades.  For example, the WCCME was greatly annoyed when 
DePere City and some other employers simply rejected the fact-finders’ recommendations.  The 
Union News called for binding arbitration.  In 1965 the law was expanded to extend limited 
bargaining rights to state employees.  In 1966, however, the WCCME suffered a setback when 
the WERB held that the Wisconsin law did not actually impose a duty to bargain in good faith.110
109Union News, Aug. 1962, 1, 2, 4; id., Sept.-Oct. 1964, 1; GOULDEN, 120; OZANNE, 76-
77.
110Union News, Nov.-Dec. 1963, 4; id., Jan. 1963, 1, 4; id., Nov.-Dec. 1965, 1, citing Bill 
389-A; SWOBODA AND SCHNEIDER, 57; Union News, March-April, 1966, 3; Anderson, 62; 
William Houlihan, Interest Arbitration and Municipal Employee Bargaining:  The Wisconsin 
Experience, in JOYCE NAJITA AND JAMES STERN, EDS., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES (2001), 72.
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But by this time, legal reform on this issue had spread across the country.  By 1966, 
sixteen states had enacted laws extending at least some organizing and bargaining rights to at 
least some public employees111  Struggles continued in other states and in Wisconsin.  In 1967, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a public employer’s contractual agreement to submit 
grievances to binding arbitration was not an unlawful delegation of the city’s legislative power.  
In 1971, the WCCME won legislative amendments providing for binding arbitration impasse 
procedures for firefighters and most police, requiring that both sides bargain in good faith, and 
allowing “agency shop” union security agreements.  In 1977, Wisconsin enacted a law (backed 
by AFSCME) that provided for binding impasse arbitration for other local government 
employees and authorized a very limited right to strike, providing a relatively definite answer to 
the question both sides had struggled with for so long.112
Conclusion
The Wisconsin laws of 1959 and 1962 were both an opening salvo and a historic 
watershed in Wisconsin and the nation.113  In 1966, Arvid Anderson wrote that the “fundamental 
111Allen Weisenfeld, Collective Bargaining by Public Employees in the U.S., in GERALD 
SOMERS, ED., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1966), 5, listing Alaska, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
112Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 
Wisc.2d 209 (1967); Union News, Nov.-Dec. 1971, 1; SWOBODA AND SCHNEIDER, 69; Chapt.  
178, Laws of 1977 (S.B.  15); Jane Henkel, “Wisconsin Legislative Council Report No.3: 
Legislation Relating to Municipal Collective Bargaining” (April 6, 1981), State Historical 
Society, 3; Union News, Nov., 1976, 1; Houlihan, 73.  The circumstances under which strikes 
are legal in Wisconsin are apparently so rare that this option has never been used.  Id., 71, 84.
113See pages 1-2, infra.
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question to be answered by this Wisconsin experiment is whether the principles and practices of 
collective bargaining.  .  .  can be transferred in whole or in part to public employment.  .  .  .  
[W]e think the tentative answer is ‘yes.’”  Indeed, in 1968 Ed Johnson, the executive director of 
the League of Municipalities, stated that “a pretty good law has been in effect for seven years 
which might stand some minor touch-ups but certainly is not in need of major surgery.”  Still, 
Johnson made a point of adding that the “word ‘sovereignty’ may be archaic, but I know of no 
better word to describe the responsibility elected officials have to their constituents.  Such 
responsibility cannot be shared with representatives of public employees.”114  Similar objections, 
resonating with the history of public sector labor relations, are still made today, as disputes over 
the proper extent of public sector bargaining, impasse resolution procedures, and related rights 
have continued into the twenty-first century, still fought state-by- state, in legislatures.  But after 
the Wisconsin laws, the legal rights of workers, public sector labor relations, the labor movement 
as a whole, and American politics have never been the same.
Even more broadly, this model of legal change represents some hope for liberals and 
progressives unlikely to win sweeping victories from the federal government or courts in at least 
the near term.  Reforms in state legislation can have dramatic effects nation wide on politics and 
human rights.  But such changes do not happen overnight.  Among the lessons of the Wisconsin 
experience is that advocates of reform must simultaneously battle in the arenas of ideas, legal 
doctrine, and old-fashioned ground-level politics.  The results may not be instantaneous, but they 
may eventually be rather astonishing.
114Anderson, 62; Ed Johnson, Emerging Problems in Labor Relations in Wisconsin Cities 
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and Villages,” in PAPERS ON BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS AND PRACTICES (1968), 4, 6.
